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Abstract
While we would expect that cross-border patents are used to protect a technology that is
made available in another country, that technology could either be produced locally or imported.
International patent filings could therefore be either complements or substitutes to international
trade. This study combines data on patenting and trade for 149 countries and 249 industries
between 1974 and 2006 with a “three-way” PPML panel data model that addresses several biases
emphasized in the trade literature in order to provide a systematic analysis of how bilateral trade
responds to cross-border patent filings. We find that cross-border patents have a positive (com-
plementary) overall effect on the patent-filing country’s exports to the patent-granting country
and no effect overall on imports flowing in the opposite direction. These effects vary substantially
across industries and destination markets. Patents promote significantly more bilateral export
growth—and significantly less bilateral import growth—in less differentiated industries and are
found to have stronger effects on exports to more distant destinations. The patent-granting
country’s level of patent protection also can play a role, but this effect is largely absent outside
of highly R&D-intensive industries and the pharmaceutical industry specifically.
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1 Introduction
As technological advancements have been a driving force behind economic growth and globalization,
flows of international trade and international patents have mirrored one another in ways that hardly
seem coincidental. Both have grown at rapid paces relative to world GDP since the 1970s (Fig.
1). And non-OECD countries have become substantially more involved both as recipients and
originators of new patents over the last several decades (Fig. 2), just as they have also become
more involved in trade in high-tech manufactured goods over this same time frame. In policy
circles, the lack of patenting rights is widely cited as an important barrier to trade and provisions
on patent protections have become increasingly central to international agreements intended to
promote and regulate trade (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; McCalman, 2001; Limão, 2007; Saggi,
2016).
And yet, despite these suggestive anecdotes, much still remains unknown about how and to what
extent patent protections influence trade. Through the lens of standard theory, we would generally
expect that firms file patents in a foreign market to protect a technology inherent in a product they
intend to sell in that market. But, empirically, we do not have evidence of how effective patents
are in this regard (or when), nor can we confidently say whether the patents we observe in the data
truly reflect the intent to export as opposed to other motivations (such as “strategic patenting”,
which aims instead to establish assets for use in potential future litigation). Indeed, when considered
carefully, theory does not give unambiguous guidance on whether trade and patenting should be
related positively or negatively to one another. To the extent that patent protection incentivizes
technology diffusion, for example, we might expect an increase in patenting activity to coincide
with reduced trade. Firms could file patents in a destination market with the intent of producing
there directly, by-passing trade and instead increasing alternate modes of foreign sales such as FDI
or licensing.1 The relationship between trade and patenting could also depend on a number of
factors that vary across industries and/or destination markets. For example, the same patent could
have a stronger influence on trade in an market with strong protections for intellectual property
rights (IPR) than in a market with only weak IPR protections. And trade and patenting could be
complements in some industries and substitutes in others.
Moreover, though a vibrant empirical literature has investigated how trade responds to na-
tional patent systems (a country-level indicator), only a few studies have examined how trade is
affected by actual cross-border patents (which vary by origin, destination, and the specific technol-
1Other reasons why the relationship and trade might be theoretically ambiguous are discussed in the following
section.
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ogy they represent). Notably, none of these studies has investigated the trends in patenting and
trade mentioned above in a panel setting with a large number of countries and for a large number
of disaggregated industries. This is a conspicuous gap in the literature given the possibility that
patents may be important for explaining the evolution of industry-level trade patterns over time as
well as for understanding the importance of national patent systems at a more granular level. In
general, the extent to which cross-border patenting has promoted trade or impeded it is a largely
open question with implications for both theory and policy.
To deliver answers, we assemble an extensive database of industry-level trade flows and patent
filings for 249 disaggregated industries and 149 countries over the 32 year period 1974-2006. We
then implement a rigorous industry-level gravity estimation methodology that specifically assesses
whether increases in bilateral patenting in a given industry are followed by increases in trade in
that same industry. By pooling across the 249 industries in our study, we are able to construct
econometric averages of the overall effects that patents have had on each direction of trade as well
as investigate whether patents have had heterogeneous effects across different types of industries
and/or across different types of markets. We are also able to exploit the panel structure of our data
to demonstrate the robustness of each of our findings to natural concerns about reverse causality
between trade and patenting.
By bringing together patent and trade data in this way, we are able to unpack several new
empirical facts about how patents are used in conjunction with trade. For our full, unconditional
sample, we find an overall complementary relationship between patents and trade: increased bilat-
eral patenting on average tends to stimulate increased bilateral exports flowing in the same direction,
with no significant effect seen for imports flowing in the opposite direction. The effect is econom-
ically significant: the difference between a “high value” flow of patents and a “low value” flow of
patents—lying respectively one log-deviation above and below the log-mean of the distribution—is
an average increase in exports of 8.87%, which is more than half of the average effect we find for a
free trade agreement (FTA) on industry-level trade.2
Digging deeper, we also investigate whether patents have stronger effects on trade in more
differentiated industries where monopoly rights over a product’s distinguishing characteristics should
be more valuable. While this may seem like a natural hypothesis, we actually find overwhelming
evidence for the opposite: patents have larger effects in less differentiated industries where patents
are relatively less valuable for protecting monopoly rights but instead serve to protect cost and
quality advantages over producers of competing products. In fact, for these less differentiated
2These results, explained in Section 5, are evaluated at the peak of a patent’s life. We calculate patent stocks
based on value-weighted patent flows, weighted by family size.
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industries in particular, patents are not only associated with increased exports from from the patent-
filing country to the patent-granting country, but also affect the opposite direction of trade as well,
reducing import growth from the patent-granting country to the filing country. Notably, these
effects are very robust, showing up across numerous different industry subgroupings and different
ways of specifying the estimation.
We also investigate other sources of heterogeneity that are of natural interest. For example, we
find some evidence that patents generally promote exports more strongly to more geographically
distant import markets. This latter result is consistent with the findings of Chalioti et al (2017) for
the effects of patenting on Greek firm-level exports and lends further support to the interpretation
that the patented technologies we observe reflect quality innovations specifically. In addition, our
results shed new light on the role that IPR institutions play in promoting trade. Contrary to
what one might expect, we do not find any overall relationship between the strength of the patent-
granting country’s IPR regime and the effect that patents filed in that country have on trade. We do,
however, find that stronger IPR regimes are important for promoting trade flows for industries with
especially high R&D intensities and for the pharmaceutical industry specifically—i.e., industries at
the forefront of debates about IPR policies and access to new technologies.
Studying the co-evolution of patents and trade over time presents a number of challenges. This
is in large part because patents are complex objects to work with empirically: they are at once
“lumpy” (occurring at irregular points in time, but intended to have effects for long durations) as
well as highly specific to the technology they derive from and destination market they are filed
in. Furthermore, as is well documented in the trade literature, accounting for the many different
dimensions of heterogeneity that naturally arise in a multilateral trade context quickly becomes
computationally difficult even for estimations with aggregate trade flows (see, e.g., Glick and Rose,
2016; Larch, Wanner, Yotov, and Zylkin, 2018).
To resolve these various challenges, we draw on several recent methodological innovations that
naturally complement our focus on cross-border patents. First, because of the natural lumpiness of
patent flows, we construct bilateral, industry-specific stock values reflecting the gradual obsolescence
of old patents filed in that market in addition to the lag in diffusion for new flows (Popp, 2002,
2003). Our analysis therefore accounts for the lasting effects of previously filed patents. Second, our
econometric specification accounts for the industry specificity of patents by effectively pooling across
249 disaggregated industry-level gravity estimations, each with its own set of exporter-industry-
time, importer-industry-time, and country pair-industry fixed effects. This “three way” fixed effects
structure accounts for numerous sources of bias that have been shown to be important in the
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literature on trade agreements (and that we similarly show to be important for assessing the effects
of patents).3 Finally, we capitalize on some recent innovations by Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin
(2019a,b) to estimate our preferred model using Poisson Psuedo-maximum Likelihood (PPML). The
use of PPML not only ensures our estimates are consistent, but also ensures they are not subject
to any aggregation bias from pooling across disaggregated industries (see French, 2019.)
As mentioned above, the prior literature examining the empirical relationship between patenting
and trade is limited in number and in scope. Most papers in this area have been constrained
by data to examining a single flow (either imports or exports), a single bilateral relationship, a
single country’s trade relationships, and/or a single industry (Anderton, 1999; Greenhalgh, 1990;
Antimiani and Costantini, 2013; Brunel, 2017; Chen, 2013; Chalioti, Drivas, and Katsimi, 2017)
The one exception is Palangkaraya, Jensen, and Webster (2017), who also use a PPML gravity
specification to examine the effects of successful patent applications on bilateral trade. They find,
as we do, that patents seem to play a role in promoting bilateral exports (that is, that patents
generally complement bilateral exports) using a data set with 13 host markets, 28 industries, and a
large number of exporting countries.4
Our investigation goes beyond that of Palangkaraya, Jensen, and Webster (2017) in several ways.
First, we investigate a wider range of effects, allowing patents to affect both directions of trade as
well as allowing for heterogeneity across different industries and across different markets. Second,
another key difference is that Palangkaraya, Jensen, and Webster (2017) focus on cross-sectional
variation in patent application outcomes for the same invention across different patent offices with
similar application processes, whereas we focus on longitudinal changes in trade within the same
pair of markets as a result of successful patent filings. Our panel approach has the advantage of
explicitly controlling for any omitted cross-sectional heterogeneity that might cause the propensity
to file a patent in particular country to be correlated with the propensity to trade with that country.
Third, our approach also facilitates our use of more expansive and varied data, with more years,
more disaggregated industries, and (especially) a wider variety of OECD as well as non-OECD
patent destinations.
In sum, we contribute to the literature by greatly expanding the geographical and industry-level
scope of existing analyses and by using a large panel dataset which matches bilateral trade flows
3The “three way” gravity model for panel data was first used by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) in their study of
the effects of free trade agreements on trade. Pooled gravity estimators are relatively new to the literature. French
(2019) describes in detail the advantages of pooled estimators such as the one described in this paper. In other recent
work, Schmidt and Steingress (2018) and Kinzius, Sandkamp, and Yalcin (2018) use similar specifications to study
the effects of product standard harmonization and non-tariff barriers, respectively.
4To be more precise, Palangkaraya, Jensen, and Webster (2017) find that the presence of either an apparent bias
in the patent application process or a “blocking prior art” in the importing country deters exports.
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to bilateral patent flows at a highly detailed level of disaggregation. We notably exploit the panel
dimension of this data to control for a large set of unobservable characteristics across both country-
pairs and industries and simultaneously address numerous well-known sources of bias that have been
articulated in the empirical trade literature and that generally cannot be addressed using firm-level
data. Because we are able to surmount these many complex data and estimation challenges, our
work is the first to pursue a comprehensive longitudinal analysis of the effects of cross-border patents
on trade as well as the first to isolate some key sources of heterogeneity in this relationship.
2 Related Literatures
While only a limited amount of analysis has been devoted to the empirical relationship between
patents and trade, an active related literature has looked at the “gravity”-like relationships that
determine the geographical distribution of knowledge capital and patent flows. These include Keller
and Yeaple (2013)’s influential work on the “gravity of knowledge” as well as Figueiredo, Guimarães,
and Woodward (2015)’s study of the industry- and location-specific clustering of patent citations.
Earlier contributions in this literature also include Robbins (2006) and Scherngell and Hu (2011).
Keller (2004) reviews the earlier literature on technology diffusion across countries, with trade being
one of the channels.
The theoretical literature on patenting and trade, meanwhile, is very rich. As also observed
in Palangkaraya, Jensen, and Webster (2017), this literature does not offer a consensus view on
whether patents and trade should be complements or substitutes. For example, in Lai and Qiu
(2003) and Grossman and Lai (2002), stronger patenting rights in the global South could decrease
trade by stimulating innovation-intensive production in the South and thereby reducing North-
South comparative advantage. Yang and Maskus (2009) show that, in a model where innovating
North firms can serve the South market via exports, FDI, or licensing, stronger patent rights in the
South can have ambiguous effects on both directions of trade, depending on the North firms’ optimal
mode of foreign sales and on their strategic incentives to transfer know-how to the South.5 And
Bond and Saggi (2014) show that patent regimes that include the threat of compulsory licensing
can induce an innovating foreign firm to serve a market directly rather than voluntarily license its
patented product.6
In addition, it is likely that patent flows and trade flows we capture in our disaggregated study
5This type of theoretical ambiguity is also discussed in McCalman (2001).
6Of course, the recent debates surrounding TRIPS and other similar international issues have stimulated a much
wider literature studying these and other related topics; for some recent surveys, see Saggi (2016) and Maskus (2018).
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in many cases reflect concurrent decisions made by the same firms (or, at least, by related firms). As
Saggi (2016) notes, “in a typical year”, over 80% of international patent royalty payments are made
between parent firms and their subsidiaries. Our work thus also broadly relates to a recent literature
that studies the role that property rights play in determining how trade in intermediate inputs within
a firm’s supply chain is organized among related entities in different countries. Representative works
in this area include Nunn and Trefler (2013), Antràs and Chor (2013), and Alfaro, Antràs, Chor,
and Conconi (2015). Also related is Blonigen (2001), who finds that FDI flows and trade flows are
substitutes for one another in final goods industries, but complement one another in intermediate
goods industries. For our part, we find that cross-border patents strongly complement exports
in intermediate goods associated with a high demand elasticity; for final goods (especially capital
goods), patents can actually reduce (i.e., “substitute for”) imports returning from the patentee
country to the filing country, but only in high-elasticity industries.
Finally, while the empirical literature on patents and trade is sparse, there is a rather extensive
body of work relating the strength of national patent institutions to trade. See, for example, Maskus
and Penubarti (1995), Briggs and Park (2014), Boring (2015), and Ivus (2010). Saggi (2002) also
provides a survey of the earlier work in this area. As also emphasized in Palangkaraya, Jensen, and
Webster (2017), an empirical design based on individual patents rather than on national institutions
is a natural complement to this line of research. Interestingly, we generally do not find that the
relationship between patents and trade varies significantly with the strength of the host country’s
IPR regime for most of the industries in our data, though we do find significant effects for the
pharmaceutical industry and for higher-R&D industries more generally.
3 Estimating the Effects of Patents on Trade
As noted in our introduction, analyzing the relationship between bilateral patents and bilateral
trade requires an ambitious empirical framework. We observe a many-country world where cross-
border patents and trade flows each vary by origin, destination, industry, and time—to be denoted
in the analysis by i, j, k, and t, respectively. We aim to identify the effects of patents on trade
by exploiting within origin-destination-industry (or “pair-industry”) variation in both patents and
trade. Part of what makes this task complex is the inter-connected nature of global trade. As
has been well known at least since Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), correctly assessing the
determinants of bilateral trade between any two countries requires first recognizing the potentially
confounding role played by multilateral factors such as market size and geography with respect to
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third countries.7 A further challenge is that patents are by their nature specific to the technologies
they derive from. It is not necessarily the case, for example, that a patent filed for the production
of aerospace equipment will affect trade in cosmetics products. We therefore require an empirical
model that simultaneously accounts for both the multilateral complexity of trade and the industry-
level specificity of a patent, as well as the many further dimensions of complexity that arise when
our object of interest simultaneously varies by industry, origin, destination, and time.
Taking all of the above concerns onboard, our proposed estimation strategy takes the form of
a “three way” panel gravity model, similar to the models currently used in the structural gravity
literature to study the effects of trade agreements and other bilateral policy arrangements (Baier
and Bergstrand, 2007; Glick and Rose, 2016; Larch, Wanner, Yotov, and Zylkin, 2018).8 We then
interact the standard set of origin-time, destination-time, and country-pair fixed effects that have
become standard in this literature with the industry dimension. That is to say, (a log-linear version
of) our preferred empirical model can be expressed as
lnXijkt = δikt + ψjkt + ηijk + βPATENTijkt + δZijkt + εijkt, (1)
where lnXijkt denotes log trade flows and PATENTijkt are our industry-level bilateral patent vari-
ables (to be described shortly). The fixed effects used are exporter-industry-time (δikt), importer-
industry-time (ψjkt), and exporter-importer-industry or “pair-industry” (ηijk). Zijkt is a set of other
time-varying controls not absorbed by ηijk (such as the presence of a free trade agreement), and
εijkt is our estimation error.
With this rich set of fixed effects in place, estimation via (1) addresses many of the leading biases
commonly cited in the literature on gravity estimation, such as the need to account for multilateral
inter-dependencies (industry-level inter-dependencies in our case, addressed by δikt and ψjkt) as well
as unobservable pair characteristics that coincide with the propensity to trade (captured by ηijk).9
More generally, we also note an appealing logic to the identification based on these fixed effects that
speaks to our objectives. Our question concerns how bilateral patenting directly affects bilateral
7In Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) (and much of the literature following Anderson and van Wincoop 2003),
each country’s trade is shown to be function of the “multilateral resistance” it faces in the world trade network,
such that standard controls such as GDP and other observables used in the traditional gravity literature are wholly
inadequate for correctly isolating the determinants of bilateral trade linkages. Furthermore, because bilateral trade
relationships and market sizes change over time, changes in multilateral resistance are themselves an important source
of changes in trade over time which should be accounted for in any panel study (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007).
8For more on gravity estimation, see Head and Mayer (2014) and Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro, and Larch (2016).
Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro, and Larch (2016) provide in-depth discussion of econometric best practices related to
three-way gravity models in particular.
9The observation that estimates of time-varying gravity variables tend to be biased in the absence of pair fixed
effects is generally credited to Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
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trade between a given pair of countries in a given industry. By completely stripping away industry-
country-specific fluctuations in trade, the country-industry-time fixed effects δikt and ψjkt allow us
to specifically isolate the pair-industry dimension of the data. The pair-industry fixed effect ηijk
then ensures that identification of β and δ is driven solely through observed time-variation within
pairs, as in standard panel data analysis.10 In as much as a patent is valuable in multiple markets,
these fixed effects guarantee that β picks up the effect of a strategic decision on where to protect
an invention, rather than the effect of the innovation associated with that patent. To be sure,
some patents could protect inventions aimed very specifically at a single market, in which case the
innovation effect of the patent would not be controlled for by the fixed effects. However, in that case,
we would expect that patents should have larger effects on trade in more differentiated industries
where other varieties are perceived as less substitutable. As we will see in the next section, our
findings do not support that hypothesis, indicating that country-specific inventions are not driving
our results.
As famously pointed out by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the log-transformation of the de-
pendent variable to construct (1) is not innocuous, since the log-OLS moment condition E[lnXijkt−̂lnXijkt|·] = 0 does not also imply that E[Xijkt − X̂ijkt|·] = 0. Estimates of (1) should therefore be
regarded as generally being inconsistent.11 Accordingly, capitalizing on recent computational inno-
vations by Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin (2019a,b) that allow for all the necessary dimensions of
the fixed effects in a PPML estimation, our fully-specified empirical design involves estimating the
above log-linear model for trade flows in levels using Poisson Pseudo-maximum Likelihood (PPML)
as the underlying estimator. That is, we estimate
Xijkt = exp [δikt + ψjkt + ηijk + βPATENTijkt + δZijkt] + νijkt. (2)
It can be shown that the above PPML estimator will provide consistent estimates of β and δ under
standard assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity contained in νijkt.12 Because it is a
10In another recent study that uses a similar methodology, Schmidt and Steingress (2018) observe that it is also
possible to include a fourth fixed effect indexed by ijt that accounts for common changes in trade across all industries
within each pair. We prefer to stick with the three-way model since it conforms to the intuition of pooling our results
across 249 individual industry-level gravity estimations. As we document in Section 5.3, our results are not materially
affected by adding this other fixed effect; in general, we find the ikt, jkt, and ijk fixed effects are much more important
for inference by comparison.
11For these types of estimations, the data generating process for Xijt is typically assumed to be a constant-elasticity
(exponential) model as shown in (2). Under this assumption, estimating a log-linearized specification only leads to
consistent estimates under the very special case where the error term εijkt is homoscedastic (a requirement that our
data strongly rejects).
12Weidner and Zylkin (2018) show that the three-way FE-PPML gravity estimator is consistent so long as the
conditional mean is correctly specified and the regressors of interest are exogenous after conditioning on the fixed
effects. The latter requirement is an important consideration in any panel study with a potentially endogenous
regressor. To deal with this concern, we follow the advice of Wooldridge (2002) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) in
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pooled estimator that pools across disaggregated industries, it also benefits from the aggregation
bias-minimizing properties of PPML described in French (2019).13
The above specification notably allows for the possibility that patents filed in a country could
affect either direction of trade—i.e., exports as well as imports returning from that country. This is
done by allowing PATENTijkt to depend on two distinct stocks of patents. The first stock follows
the same direction as the flow of trade—patents filed in country j by inventors residing country
i—and represents the effect of patents on exports. The second stock runs in the opposite direction
of the trade flow—patents filed in country i by inventors residing country j—and represents the
effect of patents on imports. The latter stock is useful for a number of reasons. For example,
patents could be used within supply chain relationships to exert control over foreign suppliers, in
which case we might observe patents facilitating imports of certain types of goods, such as parts and
components. Alternatively, imports could be affected by patents filed in another country if the filing
of the patent indirectly affects the foreign competitor’s ability to compete in the patent-holder’s
own domestic market—perhaps by altering its ability to obtain credit or by generally preventing it
from using better technologies.14
As discussed above, theory suggests numerous reasons why the effect of patenting and trade could
be ambiguous. However, to fix ideas, a reasonable prior to start with is Palangkaraya, Jensen, and
Webster (2017)’s supposition that patents have a role to play in protecting the cost and/or quality
advantages that exporters enjoy in foreign markets. Importantly, this view not only suggests a
baseline hypothesis—that patents promote bilateral exports—but also guides our more expansive
investigation of the possibly heterogeneous effects of patents on trade in two main ways. First, the
value of protecting a superior technology should be greater in less differentiated industries with a
higher elasticity of substitution between products. In these industries, the value of protecting a
cost and/or quality advantage is greater because the replication of the patent-holder’s technology
represents a more direct threat to its profitability and (similarly) because the assertion of exclusive
introducing “lead” variables that serve as a placebo test against the possibility that changes in patents are responding
to changes in trade. This placebo approach is described further below.
13French (2019) shows that pooled PPML estimation of common gravity variables such as log distance can be
rationalized as aggregating the information from industry-by-industry estimates in a way that preserves the same
aggregate trade volume in expectation. In our setting, a similar property applies that allows us to interpret β as
reflecting the partial effect of a hypothetical uniform increase in the patent stock across all industries on aggregate
bilateral trade. Because
∑
k
E[lnXijkt|·] 6= ln
∑
k
E[Xijkt|·], pooled log-OLS does not have this property and is
subject to aggregation bias.
14To be clear, a patent filed in a foreign country should only directly affect the ability of non-patent-owners to
sell a product that uses the patented technology in that country without a license. Thus, it is not obvious that
patent-owners file patents in other markets with the intention of reducing imports from that market (a patent filed
domestically would typically suffice.) Nonetheless, we observe robust evidence that patents lead to relatively less
import growth in less differentiated industries where patents are more likely to be used to protect superior production
technologies.
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patent rights over a disputed technology by a foreign firm should have a relatively larger impact on
trade. By either of these rationales, patents should be more strongly complementary to exports in
high-elasticity industries than in low-elasticity industries.15
Second, to the extent that the protected technologies enhance the quality of the product specifi-
cally, another natural hypothesis to test is whether patents promote exports to markets with higher
per-unit shipping costs. This is a version of the “Washington Apples” effect of Alchian and Allen
(1972) and has also recently been explored in the context of patents and trade by Chalioti, Drivas,
and Katsimi (2017).16 Stimulated by Chalioti, Drivas, and Katsimi (2017)’s earlier results for Greek
patent-owning firms, we will similarly examine whether patents have stronger effects on exports to
markets that are more distant geographically.17
In addition to distance, we will also consider interactions between our patents variables and
several other variables that may reflect either costs of trading or the cost of obtaining and/or
enforcing a patent. These added indicators include some additional standard gravity variables (the
sharing of a common legal system or common language) as well as a set of dummy variables reflecting
the strength of the patent-granting countries patent regime (“medium” or “high”, with “low” as an
omitted category). The inclusion of IPR levels helps us link our study to the wider literature on
IPR and trade: while stronger patent protection regimes have typically been found to be associated
with increased trade (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Ivus, 2010), it is interesting to wonder whether
the patent filings themselves are the main vehicle for this effect.
One remaining empirical challenge lies in the potential endogeneity of patents and trade. In
general, estimates of the elasticity with respect to trade will be biased if (partner-specific) changes
in export demand or import supply affect the number of inventions that are subsequently patented
in the partner country. Import competition, for example, has been shown by some recent papers to
stifle innovation in the home country in some cases (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and Shu, 2016;
Batrakova and Dechezleprêtre, 2013) and boost it in others (Bloom, Draca, and Reenen, 2011).
Alternatively, a high level of trade in technology-intensive goods could point to a market that is
15As noted above, we are taking the view that the patented technologies we observe are inputs that either lower the
cost of producing a product or enhance its quality. A competing view would be that the patents we observe protect
the distinguishing characteristics that differentiate the product in the eyes of end-users. In that case, we might expect
patents to have more pronounced effects in less differentiated industries. This is not what we find.
16For empirical evidence of the “Washington Apples” effect, see Borcherding and Silberberg (1978) and more
recently Hummels and Skiba (2004). Chalioti, Drivas, and Katsimi (2017) find that patent-holding Greek exporters
gain more market shares in more distant markets and in industries that have a larger number of firms. They show
this finding is consistent with a theory where patents are used to protect the innovations embedded in higher quality
exports.
17We will also consider interactions between our patent variables and other indicators commonly associated with
trade costs (namely, the sharing of a common legal system or common language), though these variables are arguably
more likely to reflect the costs of obtaining and/or enforcing a patent than per-unit shipping costs.
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highly active and innovative, or, on the contrary, to one where existing technologies are sufficient
and patenting has plateaued. Moreover, multinational corporations could be influenced by strong
existing trade relationships in their decisions about where to locate production. A strong bilateral
trade relationship could thus be a precursor for a multinational corporation filing a patent to setup
production capacity abroad.
To address these concerns, we would ideally want an instrument for bilateral patenting that
is time-varying, industry- and pair-specific, and is strongly correlated with patent growth, but
exogenous to changes in bilateral trade. A good instrument meeting these criteria is hard to find
in this context, especially given the number of interactions we would ultimately need to instrument
for. Consequently, our main strategy for assessing the direction of causality is to perform a set of
standard placebo tests to determine whether the changes in trade identifying our results occur on or
after the observed change in the patent stock (see Wooldridge, 2002; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007.)
By constructing appropriate “lead” terms for our stock variables and their associated interactions
(corresponding to the values these variables will take in 4 years time) we can effectively test whether
our results may actually be picking up causality flowing from changes in trade to changes in bilateral
patenting decisions. We also experiment with controlling for a range of different factors that may
have independently affected bilateral trade flows during the period—such as changes in the effect
of geographic distance, for instance—and allow these factors to vary with the R&D intensity of the
industry. As we will see, our results are generally robust to these types of tests.
4 Data Construction
4.1 Trade Flows and Other Gravity Variables
The trade dataset consists of bilateral trade flows between 149 developing and developed countries
for 249 industries at 3-digit level based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)
revision 2. We construct this data by combining the standard 1962-2000 NBER-UN World Trade
Flows dataset of Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005) with additional data for 2000-2006
obtained from UN COMTRADE. We obtain a panel dataset covering both exports and imports
between these countries from 1974-2006, using every 4 years. Both the start and the end of the
time period are dictated by the patent data detailed in the next section. The use of every 4
years is following the recommendations of Cheng and Wall (2005) and also helps with facilitating
computation.18
18Specifically, Cheng and Wall (2005) note that “fixed-effects estimations are sometimes criticized when applied to
data pooled over consecutive years on the grounds that dependent and independent variables cannot fully adjust in a
11
In order to investigate which types of industries drive which results, we find it useful to examine
industry subgroups with similar factor intensities or usage patterns. Industry-level indicators for
skill intensity, R&D intensity, and different measures of capital intensity are taken from Nunn and
Trefler (2013). These data are originally provided at the Harmonized System (HS) 6 digit level,
which we map to our own SITC-based industry codes using a concordance from the World Integrated
Trade Systems. For data on the usage of each industry, we obtain UN Broad Economic Category
(BEC) codes at the HS6 level from UN COMTRADE and concord them to SITC using the same
concordance. Multiple HS codes can map to the same SITC-based industry; thus, we assign shares
based on world exports of each HS category to construct usage shares for each SITC industry. We
often find it useful to use these indicators to partition industries into different subcategories. For
example, we divide industries into high-, medium-, and low-tech industries by establishing cutoffs
at the 67th percentile and 33rd percentile of the R&D intensity distribution.
In addition, a particularly appealing variable for our analysis is the demand elasticity for each
industry, which reflects the degree of price competition and product differentiation. We would
naturally expect patent protections to play an important role in industries characterized by a high
demand elasticity (indicating a relatively low degree of product differentiation), since it is in these
industries that rival innovation and/or imitation most directly threatens the market share of an
innovating firm. To construct our elasticity variables, we first obtain detailed estimates of import
demand elasticities at the 3 digit SITC level from Broda andWeinstein (2006). Then, to acknowledge
that the point estimates of these industry-specific elasticities are measured with error, we construct
an indicator that is equal to 1 if the estimated elasticity is above the median estimate across all
249 3-digit industries in our data.19 We then focus on the results for patents in “high” versus “low”
elasticity industries to test our hypotheses with respect to the demand elasticity.
Finally, for data on free trade agreements (FTAs), we consult the NSF-Kellogg database on
Economic Integration Agreements created by Scott Baier and Jeff Bergstrand.20
4.2 Bilateral Patent Flows and Stocks
The patent data are drawn from the 2013 version of the PATSTAT database, which includes all
patent applications published at the national patent offices of the 149 countries in our sample as
single year’s time.” In our context, the use of intervals that span multiple years allows us to more cleanly observe the
response of trade to changes in the patent stock. Our assumption that the effects of patents do not have their peak
impact until several years after filing also assists in warding against this critique.
19The median elasticity in our data is about 2.53. Broda and Weinstein (2006) also provide their own indicators
for “high”, “medium”, and “low” elasticities. Our results are very similar if we use these indicators instead, though
we generally find the latter two categories have statistically similar effects to one another.
20This database is available for download on Jeff Bergstrand’s website: https://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/.
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well as the European Patent Office (EPO) and from which we pull all patents filed through 2006.21
The extraction includes all patents filed into one of our 149 countries in all industries, regardless
of the origin of the inventor, and all patents filed anywhere in the world by an inventor residing in
one of the 149 countries in our sample.
Since a patent grants protection for a technology only in the country where it is filed, inventors
have to file in all countries in which they desire protection. In our data, there is one exception:
patents filed at the European Patent Office (EPO), which covers a number of European countries. A
patent filed at the EPO would only be applicable in countries designated on the patent application
but the designation data is not available in PATSTAT. Since each additional country designation
incurred a fee, inventors have an incentive to be selective in the countries they designate. However,
designation data collected for a subset of patents in Brunel (2017) shows that the list of designated
countries often covered more than half of the EPO members and often all the largest EPO member
economies. Therefore, throughout our time period, we assign an EPO patent to all EPO member
countries in that year.22 Since this is not exact, we also provide robustness checks without EPO
patents.
Patents are classified by the end-use of the technology based on the International Patent Clas-
sification (IPC), which can be matched to trade data classification using concordances developed in
Lybbert and Zolas (2014).23 We match the IPC data to SITC rev. 2 at the 3-digit level.24
Patents have the advantage of being widely available and classified in a way that is linkable to
trade data. However, several drawbacks of the data are worth discussing. First, given that filing a
patent implies disclosing information on the technology, some inventors might chose to refrain from
patenting their products. However, research shows that few inventors opt to protect the secrecy of
their inventions, especially when the invention is more valuable (Dernis and Khan, 2004).
Second, different patents can have widely different values. A patent grants the inventor the
exclusive right to use the technology. Some patents are used extensively by either protecting large
21The PATSTAT 2013 database contains patents through 2012 but we truncate the data to 2006 for two reasons.
First, there can be delays between the date of patent filing and the date of publication—up to 18 month for patents
filed at the EPO (Lotti and Marin, 2013). Since we only observe published patents, counts in the years running up
to 2012 suffer from missing observations (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenber, 2001). Second, more recent patents have not
had as much time to be transferred to other countries, meaning that they will have lower family sizes. As explained
in this section, we weight patents by family size to account for value so patent counts in the few years preceding 2012
would appear to have low values. For both both of these reasons, we do not include the year 2010 in our analysis,
though the results are qualitatively similar if we include 2010.
22The list of EPO members and date of accession can be found at https://www.epo.org/about-us/foundation/
member-states/date.html
23The concordances are available from Professor Lybbert’s website: https://are.ucdavis.edu/people/faculty/
travis-lybbert/research/concordances-patents-and-trademarks/
24Some IPC codes match to multiple SITC categories, so the flows can be non-integer values.
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amounts of production, being licensed to a wide number of users, or being filed in many different
countries. On the other hand, some published patents are not granted or not enforced. In accordance
with the literature, we account for the value of a patent weighing each patent by its family size,
i.e., the number of countries in which that invention is patented. The logic behind this weighting
system is that an invention that is not very valuable will most likely not seek wide geographical
coverage. It is especially important to keep track of the value since our analysis covers a wide range
of different sectors, and value is likely to differ across industries.25
We construct two measures of patents using this data. The first is a count of patents filed in each
year weighted by family size, which represents the flow of new patents in any given year. However,
trade flows between two countries are not only affected by the new flows of patents, but could also
be influenced by existing patents. Therefore, we also create a stock of patents in each year. In
aggregating patents, we account for a diffusion time, since a brand new patent might not be known
and used immediately, and a decay rate as technologies lose relevance over time. The use of the
patent should thus theoretically increase and then decrease as the technology eventually becomes
outdated. Therefore, as in Popp (2002), we aggregate bilateral patent stocks in the following way:
K̂ijkt =
∞∑
s=0
e−ω1s(1− e−ω2(1+s))× PATijk(t−s) (3)
where ω1 is the decay rate set to 0.1, and ω2 corresponds to the rate of diffusion and set at 0.25,
following Popp (2003).26 In line with the literature, which finds that R&D capital peaks between 3
and 5 years (Griliches, 1995), these two parameters imply the impact of a patent on trade should
peak at about 4 years on average,27 which should help us to decouple the timing of the decision
to patent from the timing of trade, even before we consider any placebos. Because the life of a
patent has been shown to vary by industry and originating country (Pakes and Simpson, 1989;
Schankerman, 1998), we also experiment with alternative values for ω1 and ω2 that allow for faster
and slower rates of diffusion and decay in our sensitivity analysis.
We use the subscript ijkt to denote the value of the patent stock in industry k owned by filing
country i in destination j at time t. Therefore, we may consider “two way” effects of bilateral
25To be sure, there are other ways of accounting for the value of patents, notably through citations data. Both
have been proven to be significantly correlated with patent value and with each other. However, as discussed in
De Rassenfosse (2013), the average family size is the “most internationally comparable indicator” since citation
practices and the availability of citations data differ significantly across different patenting jurisdictions.
26Other papers which use these same parameters include Popp, Hascic, and Medhi (2011), Lovely and Popp (2011),
and Brunel (2017).
27We do not have information on the length of validity for each patent and that length varies across patent offices.
However, given our stock formula, the bulk of a patent’s contribution to the stock occurs in the first 15 years, which
is less than the 20 year patent term in the United States for example.
14
patenting on trade: sticking with the same notation as above, “K̂ijkt” will denote the exporter
(i)’s patent stock in the importing country (j) in industry k at time t. However, we also consider
the effect of “K̂jikt”, which will be used to assess how patents affect the flow of trade in the other
direction (i.e., how j’s filing a patent in country i affects its imports from i).
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the raw patent counts (unweighted), patent counts
weighted by family size, as well as for stocks. On average across all industries, time, and country
pairs, there are 7 new patents filed—33 on a value-weighted basis—and the stock mean is 179. For
both measures, the standard deviation indicates a large amount of variation in patenting across
our dataset. Stocks and flows by country pair-industry-year can often be 0 (the median is zero
or small for all rows) but value-weighted stocks can also reach a maximum value of over 500,000.
Unsurprisingly, both stocks and flows are larger for patents filed in OECD countries than for patents
filed in non-OECD countries by an order of magnitude. Since the distribution of stock values is
severely skewed, we use a log transformation of these stocks in our analysis, which means we can
only identify the effect of a stock after at least one patent has been filed. Focusing on non-zero
stocks, typical values remain small: the median values of bilateral industry-specific patent stocks
range from 2 for non-OECD countries to 19 for the OECD group.
5 Results
Having described our methods and data, we now turn to our main analysis, in which we investigate
the effects of cross-border patenting on trade. We start with a broad analysis, deriving at first
a set of overall, pooled estimates of how patents affect each direction of trade across all markets
and industry types. Subsequent specifications then dig deeper into the heterogeneous patterns
underlying these overall relationships, allowing for heterogeneity across industries, across markets,
and within industry subgroups. A battery of sensitivity checks then follows.
5.1 Do Cross-border Patents Promote Trade?
Our empirical investigation begins in Table 2. Columns 1-7 of this table report PPML estimates
of the effects of changes in the bilateral patent stock on both directions of bilateral trade (exports
and imports), along with the estimated effect of an FTA (a standard time-varying control from
the gravity literature). In addition to answering our main question of interest—do cross-border
patents promote trade?—Table 2 also serves to highlight the validity and meaningfulness of our
preferred fixed effects specification from (2). Column 1 starts with a relatively simple specification,
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with country-pair and time fixed effects only. Subsequent columns introduce industry fixed effects
(column 2) and standard exporter-time and importer-time “gravity” fixed effects (column 3), before
going on to demonstrate how interacting the country-pair and country-time fixed effects with the
industry dimension matters for inference (columns 4-7). All reported standard errors are clustered
by country-pair. Since patents are observed at the industry-country-pair level, this should lead to
conservative inferences that allow for correlated changes across different industries within the same
pair.
The main messages from Table 2 are two-fold. First, the varying of the fixed effects across
columns reveals that using a more relaxed fixed effects specification introduces large biases in
our estimates. When exporter-industry-time and importer-industry-time fixed effects are not used
(in columns 1-3 and 5-6), both the export-side and import-side coefficients are always statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level and the export-side effect is always larger than 0.1. When these fixed
effects are added, the import effect always becomes statistically and economically near-zero while
the estimated export effect falls by an order of magnitude. As discussed in French (2016, 2019), these
ikt- and jkt-specific fixed effects can be thought of as respectively capturing the exporter’s industry-
level comparative advantages and the importer’s pattern of relative demands. Our results therefore
indicate that these industry-country-specific supply and demand shifters change substantially over
the sample and should generally be regarded as an important source of bias in panel data gravity
settings, consistent with the arguments of French (2016, 2019).28 Introducing exporter-importer-
pair effects also dramatically reduces the magnitude of the export effect (compare columns 1 & 5, 3
& 6, or 4 & 7.) This is evidently because the propensity to trade is heterogeneous across industries
within exporter-importer pairs and this heterogeneity is correlated with the propensity to file a
patent in the importing country.
Second, while moving to our preferred fixed effects specification in column 7 is seen to reduce
each estimate substantially, the effect of patenting on exports remains positive and statistically
significant. The estimated coefficient for the export effect of 0.018 can be interpreted in a variety
of ways (depending on whether one considers the filing of a single patent, multiple patent filings,
or more simply a change in the stock value). But to establish a baseline for comparison, we note
that the family-weighted flow of patents filed in a particular industry and country in a particular
year is well-approximated by a log-normal distribution. If we define a “high value” patent flow
PAT high as having a value lying one log-standard deviation above the distribution’s log-mean, and
a “low value” patent as having a value one log-standard deviation below the log-mean, we obtain
28Notice it is these fixed effects, not the ijk pair-industry fixed effect, that has the largest effect on the FTA
coefficient, which is not industry-specific.
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values of PAT high = 155.774 and PAT low = 1.125. Applying our estimated coefficient of 0.018 to
these values along with the formula we use for the stock value in (3) suggests high value patent
flows increase industry-level exports at their peak by 8.87% relative to low value patent flows.29
For comparison, this effect represents about half of our estimated boost to industry-level trade from
participating in an FTA. No overall effect is found for bilateral imports returning in the opposite
direction.
Our next task is to determine whether we can reasonably say these estimates reflect causality.
First, rather than patents affecting flows of trade, causality could flow from trade to patents; thus,
in column 8 of Table 2, we use “lead” stock values to test whether changes in the patent stock in
a prior year anticipate changes in trade. These lead variables are economically and statistically
near-zero while the original estimates are scarcely changed.30 Second, despite the rich set of fixed
effects included, we still may be worried that our estimates fail to control for other dynamic factors
that have had industry-specific impacts on trade aside from patents and FTAs (the dissemination
of the internet, for example). For this reason, we experiment with adding standard gravity controls
(log distance, common language, common legal system) interacted with a time fixed effect as well
as with a set of indicators reflecting the industry’s degree of R&D intensity. The addition of
these controls provides a reasonable test of whether our estimates are being driven by industries
with different levels of patent activity responding differently to potentially omitted dynamic factors
such as changes in transportation costs and infrastructure systems, ease of communication, and
contracting or other similar frictions. The results, shown in column 9, are essentially unchanged.
These two simple tests lends significant credibility to a causal interpretation of the results shown
in column 7.
5.2 Exploring the Heterogeneous Effects of Patents on Trade
While our overall results shown in Table 2 are informative, patents can be used for very different
purposes (Griliches, 1998; De Rassenfosse, Palangkaraya, and Webster, 2016). The effects of patents
on trade flows are therefore likely to depend in a heterogeneous way on the industry-level and market-
level contexts in which patents are used. Investigating this heterogeneity is important for informing
29We obtain this number using 0.018×[log(e−0.1×5(1−e−0.25×6)×PAThigh)−log(e−0.1×5(1−e−0.25×6)×PAT low)].
Alternatively, if we consider “very high” and “very low” value patent flows that respectively lie at the 95th percentile
and 5th percentiles of the distribution, we obtain a difference in peak effects of 14.6%.
30What’s more, recall that our stock variables assume patents only reach their peak value 5 years after the date of
filing. If anything, this assumption should lend more conservatism to this type of test by making it more likely that
we observe significant lead coefficients in column 8. Also notice that the lead value for “FTA” in Table 2 is actually
marginally significant, which generally goes to show that it is by no means unlikely that we should find evidence of
anticipation effects and/or pre-trends in the data.
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new theory as well as for understanding how the international patent data may be mapped onto
existing ways of thinking about trade and innovation.
Once we go beyond the broad empirical question of whether patents affect trade, the next
source of potential ambiguity in this relationship we wish to speak to is what types of innovations
the patents we observe generally represent. To fix ideas, consider a monopolistically competitive
environment of a kind often used to study trade and patent protection where firms produce im-
perfectly substitutable varieties.31 In this type of environment, if patents are used to patent the
“variety” itself, the value of owning exclusive rights over that variety is larger when varieties are
more differentiated from one another. However, if patents instead are used to protect innovations
that generate cost and/or quality advantages for the producer of a particular variety over other
producers, we should observe the opposite: patents should have larger effects for less differentiated
industries where cost and quality differences weigh more heavily on market share.
Column 2 of Table 3 interacts both of our patent stock variables with a “high elasticity” indi-
cator equal to 1 for industries with an above-median demand elasticity, 0 otherwise. The results
overwhelmingly support the interpretation that patents have larger effects on trade in less differen-
tiated (i.e., high-elasticity) industries.32 In fact, not only do we find that our earlier positive and
significant estimates for the effects of the exporter’s patent stock on trade are entirely driven by
high-elasticity industries, we also find that the interaction between “high elasticity” and the im-
porter ’s stock of patents in the exporting country is significant and negative. To interpret, patents
in high-elasticity industries appear to induce anti-competitive effects affecting both directions of
trade: the patent filing country’s exports grow and the patent-granting country’s exports to the
filing country fall relative to exports in other sectors. Note that we cannot definitively say whether
this latter interaction is significant because patents increase low-elasticity imports or because they
significantly decrease high-elasticity imports. Neither the main import effect nor the sum of the
main effect and its interaction with “high elasticity” are statistically significant.33
What we can say is that the effects of patents on exports in high-elasticity industries specifically
is highly significant economically in addition to being statistically significant. The sum of the coef-
ficients on “log K̂ijkt” and “log K̂ijkt × high elasticity” is 0.038 and is itself statistically significant
31For a canonical example, see Grossman and Lai (2004).
32Interestingly, the distributions of patents are very similar in high- and low-elasticity industries, implying no
important difference between the two industry groups in terms of the value of patents.
33One explanation for this ambiguity is demonstrated in column 3, which suggests a slight negative pre-trend for
imports in low-elasticity industries versus high-elasticity industries and (as a consequence) shows a significant and
positive contemporaneous effect for imports in low elasticity industries. Another explanation, which we will document
momentarily, involves the narrow concentration of these negative effects on imports in “capital goods” categories in
particular.
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(p < 0.01). Using our earlier calculations, this combined coefficient equates to a difference in peak
effects on exporting of 18.7% for high- versus low-value patent flows in these industries, comparable
to the average effect of an FTA on industry-level trade. Furthermore, the leads associated with all
patent variables from column 2 of Table 3, added next in column 3, continue to show no evidence
of significant pre-trends in trade in either direction of trade. Notably, they also show no evidence
that pre-trends in high-elasticity industries differ significantly either from zero or from pre-trends
in other industries.
Next, we test for evidence whether the patents we observe represent innovations that affect the
quality of the product specifically (as opposed to only affecting the production cost). Following
the “Washington apples” literature, we include interactions between our patent stock variables
and the log of bilateral distance, a natural proxy for the per-unit shipping costs that are needed
to induce a “Washington apples”-type effect in this context. As column 4 of Table 3 shows, the
interaction between log K̂ijkt (the export-side patent stock) and the log of distance in column
is positive and significant, indicating the effect of patents on exports is larger for more distant
markets as expected.34 Columns 5-7 shows this effect remains steady when we add leads (column
5), interactions with “high elasticity” (column 6), or both (column 7). Our earlier results for
“high elasticity” are also unaffected. Consistent with our earlier results, the import effect remains
insignificant. When we add leads in column 5 and 7, the lead effect for the import-side patent
stock-distance interaction (“log K̂jikt+4 × ln DIST”) is negative and statistically significant, which
may suggest a pre-trend on the import effect for more distant markets but does not take away from
the other results. Moreover, as we add more interactions between the two patent stocks and other
variables in this way, this type of test should be expected to become more demanding.
The last column of Table 3 then interacts both stock variables with several further controls that
could affect trade costs and/or patenting costs. These include the sharing of a common language
or legal system as well as indicators for whether the patent-granting countries has a “medium” or
“high” level of intellectual property rights protections. These latter dummies use the Park (2008)
index for the quality of patent protections, a standard measure in the literature. Specifically, the
index scores countries between 0 and 5. “Low”, “medium”, and “high” IPR correspond to scores
less than 2, between 2 and 4, and above 4 respectively. The inclusion of IPR rights is important
because it allows us to investigate whether patents require a strong enforcement environment in
34Since log distance is a continuous variable, we use the difference between log distance and the mean log distance
for these interactions. This means all other point estimates can be interpreted as occurring at the mean log distance
between countries. If we do not do this, the main effect captures the mean log distance effect and changes in the mean
effect across specifications become harder to interpret.
19
order to have an effect on trade. Interestingly, the interactions between patent stocks and the IPR
indicators are not significant. A possible explanation is that higher IPR protections may attract
both trade and other channels for foreign sales that substitute for trade in roughly equal measure.
Or, it could be that patenting institutions are more important for certain industries over others—a
premise we will revisit shortly. Our earlier results are not materially affected by the addition of
these controls.35
High- and medium-tech versus low-tech industries. Having established these results for
all 249 industries in our data, a natural way of further demonstrating their validity is to separate
out the industries where we would expect to observe patents playing an important role. Following
Palangkaraya, Jensen, and Webster (2017), we therefore show in Table 4 how our results vary
across “high- and medium-tech” industries versus “low-tech” industries. To make this distinction,
we use industries whose R&D intensities lie above the 33rd percentile as the “high- and medium-
tech” group of industries. All other industries are considered “low-tech”. As Table 4 shows, our
earlier results are driven entirely by high- and medium-tech industries.36 We also break out results
for the high- and medium-tech categories individually. As one might expect, results are mostly
similar across both industry groups, with a few key differences. One of these differences is the
coefficient for the import-side interaction with “high elasticity”, which is only significant for high-
tech industries. However, the more striking difference is the emergence of significant coefficients for
the effects of IPR. While our IPR variables do not appear to matter for medium-tech industries,
we do observe that having either a medium or high level of IPR protections in the patent-granting
country is important for promoting exports of high-tech goods to these countries. The effects are
not strictly rank-ordered—the interaction with medium IPR has a coefficient of 0.106, whereas the
interaction for high IPR has a coefficient of 0.068—but these results nonetheless lend themselves to
the interpretation that stronger patent protections have mainly enhanced the effects of patents in
some key industries over others.
Heterogeneous effects by end-usage. Given that the cross-border patenting may be impor-
tant for the spreading and deepening of global supply chains, another interesting way of splitting
35While we document statistically significant interactions for some of these controls that could invite various
interpretations (perhaps sharing common legal substitutes substitutes for stronger patenting, for example.), we have
generally found these results disappear when we examine pre-trends for these interactions. Thus, we have chosen not
to devote much exposition to interpreting these coefficients, preferring instead to view them mainly as controls worth
taking into account.
36We have not included lead variables for the results for high- and medium-tech industry groupings, but we have
investigated further specifications that include these lead variables and continued to find no evidence that pre-trends
are driving our results. This is the case also for all remaining tables: the results remain even with the inclusion of
lead variables, which are consistently not significant.
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up industries is by end-usage (e.g., as intermediate inputs versus final goods). Columns 3-8 of
Table 5 thus examine how our earlier results vary for intermediate goods, final goods, two differ-
ent final goods subcategories (“consumption goods” and “capital goods”), and the pharmaceutical
industry. The latter warrants particular focus due to its centrality to international policy debates
surrounding IPR and IPR reform. All results repeat the same specification from the last column
of Table 3 with a full set of controls. Considering first the results for intermediates, final goods,
capital goods, and consumption goods (columns 3-6), results do not vary much across these very
different product categories. All of these industry subgroupings aside from capital goods exhibit
positive and significant effects for exports in high elasticity industries within that category. Even
for capital goods, results are not especially dissimilar: while we do not observe significant effects for
capital goods exports for either high or low elasticity industries, the negative and highly significant
coefficient for “log K̂jikt × high elasticity” of −0.045 (p < 0.01) for capital goods indicates that,
even though capital goods exports do not increase following the filing of new patents, competition
in the patent-holder’s own domestic market may still be affected. Results for distance and other
controls do not change much in magnitude either across intermediate goods versus final goods or
capital goods versus consumption goods, though the statistical significance of distance appears to be
mainly driven by the intermediate goods category. We also note a positive and significant coefficient
for the effect of “high IPR” on exports of consumption goods specifically.
The last two columns of Table 5 specifically investigate whether the level of IPR in the patent-
granting country matters more for the pharmaceutical industry (SITC code 541) than for other
industries. Previous studies by Delgado, Kyle, and McGahan (2013) and Maskus and Riley (2016)
have indicated that strong IPR regimes boost flows of trade in both directions (both exports and
imports) in the pharmaceutical industry specifically and have much weaker effects in other indus-
tries. Our own results when we split out pharmaceutical products are similar. In particular, we find
strong evidence that pharmaceutical patents filed in medium- or high-IPR countries promote more
trade out of these countries, which suggests these countries tend to be used as export platforms
for distribution back to the patent-filing country. The two coefficients are quite large—0.282 for
medium-IPR and 0.320 for high-IPR—with both being being statistically significant at the p < 0.01
significance level (though not significantly different from each other). To a lesser extent, we also
find that patents have a larger impact on direct exports to high-IPR import markets versus other
markets, but this latter effect, while not small, is not as large (β = 0.135) and is only marginally
significant statistically (p = 0.094).
We also show results for “homogeneous” industries versus “differentiated” industries, using the
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Rauch (1999) measure of product differentiation. These experiments, shown in columns 1 and
2 of Table 5, are motivated based on our preference for the elasticity estimates from Broda and
Weinstein (2006) as our measure of differentiation. Notably, our results for industries we classify
as “differentiated” based on Rauch (1999)’s coding in column 1 continue to demonstrate similar
coefficients for the two interactions between our patent stock variables and our index based on
Broda and Weinstein (2006)’s estimates as we have seen throughout the preceding experiments. The
coefficient for the export-side distance effect is also similar as before. The results for “homogeneous”
industries are slightly different, showing no significant effect of patents on exports, but a large and
significant negative coefficient for log K̂jikt × high elasticity. The takeaway here again seems to be
that the degree of differentiation appears to matter within either broad category.
Heterogeneous effects by factor-intensity. Continuing in a similar vein as Table 5, Table
6 shows further results for industry subgroupings broken out by factor intensity. Thanks to the
rich data provided by Nunn and Trefler (2013), we are able to consider a very wide range of
factor intensities, including not only capital intensity, skill intensity, and labor intensity, but also
several different subcategories of capital intensity (building intensity, machine intensity, automobile
intensity, computer intensity, and “other capital” intensity”) as well as the value added share. For
most of these factor intensity measures, we take any industry with a factor intensity above the
median across all industries to be intensive in that factor. The one exception is for labor-intensive
industries, which we take to be any industry that is neither skill-intensive nor capital-intensive.
The different columns of Table 6 show results for the sets of industries that are especially
intensive in each of these factors (including the share of value added in the value of output). The
results are once again strikingly similar across all the different industry types we consider. Taken
together with our earlier results, we can conclude the sources of heterogeneity we are identifying in
our full data set are very common across many different types of industries, especially our results
for industries associated with a higher elasticity of substitution.
5.3 Additional Sensitivity Checks
Because the empirical framework we have constructed requires a complex set of choices on our part,
Table 7 examines the sensitivity of our analysis to various reasonable alternatives. We consider
first whether our results are affected by dropping all EPO countries from our sample. Noting that
our PATSTAT data does not indicate the country (or countries) where EPO patents are designated
to be applied, this is an important check that ensures our results are not driven by how we have
treated these patents. Though removing the EPO is very costly in terms of how it affects the
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sample (removing 80% of the original number of observations), we actually find that our results for
patenting in high elasticity industries are, if anything, even stronger than before. On the other hand,
the distance effect we observed for exports in the full sample declines in magnitude substantially
without the EPO (from 0.011 to 0.002) and also loses its statistical significance.
Next, Column 2 of Table 7 experiments with dropping only a single country, the U.S. The
motivation behind this check is the concern that our results could be driven by “non-practicing
entities” (often referred to as “patent trolls”), which are known for asserting patent rights inventions
without actually producing products associated with those innovations.37 Anecdotally, patent trolls
are known to be predominantly active in the U.S. (Fusco, 2013). Dropping the U.S. entirely is thus
a conservative way of dealing with this concern. Patents continue to have a statistically significant
effect on exports in high elasticity industries when the U.S. is removed, though our results for imports
in high-elasticity industries and for the interaction with distance weaken and become statistically
insignificant. An interesting observation based on this experiment is that the inclusion of the U.S.
as an exporter is necessary for us to observe differences between high- and low-elasticity industries
on the import side.
Column 3 of Table 7 drops any importer with a “low” level of intellectual property rights
protection (i.e., a Park index below 2). Intuitively, we might expect low-IPR countries to be less
relevant as patent destinations. However, compared with earlier results, the main difference that
sticks out here is that patents become more effective for promoting exports over longer distances.
One possible interpretation is that higher IPR protections may be relatively more conducive for
protecting quality innovations versus other innovations.
Columns 4-5 experiment with varying the fixed effects used. Column 4 adopts an even more
rigorous fixed effects specification with an added ijt fixed effect that accounts for common trends
in trade within pairs across all industries. Column 5 moves in the other direction by relaxing our
ikt and jkt fixed effects in favor of it, jt, and kt fixed effects. Neither change substantially affects
our prior results for the role of the elasticity of substitution, but the results without ikt and jkt
fixed effects lead to a large and significant coefficient for the main import effect of 0.074, consistent
with the upward bias found earlier in Table 7.38 Column 6 then considers time-varying trade cost
37This is related also to “strategic patenting”, where firms acquire patents in order to raise their rivals’ costs of
potential litigation and as bargaining chips for settling disputes. If this type of patenting was driving our results, we
should see no effect of patents filed by country i in country j on trade between that ij pair. Our results clearly show
this is not the case.
38An alternative interpretation might be that patents are stimulating spillovers in productivity that induce increased
exports from the patent-granting country to all destinations (i.e., not just to the country where the patent originated
from). In our preferred specification, this type of spillover is absorbed by the ikt fixed effect. In general, it is hard
to determine whether patents flow to sectors with fast productivity growth or whether foreign patents flowing to a
particular sector independently contributes to changes in sectoral comparative advantage. This alone could be the
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controls, as were previously deployed in column 9 of Table 2. The results are again very similar to
those from previous specifications; the one difference is that the interactions between the common
language dummy and the two patent stock variables become negative and significant. A possible
interpretation is that obtaining a patent in a foreign market helps overcome information frictions
related to trading with that market.
Finally, columns 7-9 employ various alternative ways of constructing our patent stock variables.
Column 6 uses alternate stock values calculated using ω1 = 0.35 and ω2 = 0.05, which correspond
to faster diffusion and slower decay relative to our baseline. The stocks used in column 7 assume
ω1 = ω2 = 0.15, or slower diffusion and faster decay. Interestingly, these two sets of results are more
similar to one another than they are to our original results, though they are not radically different
either. A simple goodness of fit test indicates our preferred values for ω1 and ω2 give us stock values
that fit the data better than either of these alternatives. The last column uses log(1 + K̂) instead
of log K̂ for the two patent variables. This change in functional form has the advantage of enabling
us to include additional observations where K̂ is 0 (tripling the sample), but has the disadvantages
of imposing strong assumptions about how observations with zero stock values should be treated
and altering the assumed life span of a patent. At any rate, the general result that patents promote
exports in more elastic sectors is overwhelmingly supported here as well. We do not observe any
significant results for distance or for imports in more elastic sectors, however. It is plausible these
latter results emanate from the gradual accumulation of existing patent stocks over time, rather
than from the initiation of new patent stocks.
6 Conclusion
Cross-border patenting is regarded anecdotally and theoretically as an important marker of glob-
alization and the spread of knowledge across borders. But what the decision to file a patent in a
particular trade partner can tell us about the motivations behind cross-border patents and their
implications for trade remains an open question. To provide answers, we assemble a highly dis-
aggregated data set of industry-level trade flows and cross-border patents, which we subject to a
rich set of fixed effects that allow us to specifically isolate the bilateral dimension of the data for a
given industry. Notably, ours is the first study to systematically investigate what the implications
of bilateral patenting are for international trade using a large and highly disaggregated data set.
Our main finding is that bilateral patents in a given industry on average promote bilateral ex-
subject of a future study building on the methods put forward in this paper.
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ports in that same industry, with no significant effect seen for imports returning in the opposite
direction. However, we find these overall results mask substantial sources of heterogeneity across
industries and across markets. Namely, we find very strong evidence that the pro-exporting effects
of patents are concentrated in less differentiated industries and slightly weaker (though still on the
whole robust) evidence that import growth in less differentiated industries is concurrently nega-
tively affected. We also find some evidence the patents promote exports more strongly to more
distant markets. The strength of the local IPR regime can also matter, but patents actually affect
trade irrespective of the IPR regime for most industries. Taken together, these results support
the interpretation that cross-border patents are used to preserve advantages in production costs
and/or product quality versus foreign competitors and that they are often effective at securing
these advantages even in the absence of a strong IPR regime. Given that technology diffusion is a
significant determinant of economic growth (Comin and Hobijn, 2010), we hope these findings can
inform policies intended to stimulate innovation and promote the diffusion of knowledge.
A further intended contribution of this paper is our attempt to provide a methodology that can
be used to analyze bilateral patent flows in conjunction with bilateral trade flows in a panel setting.
By allowing patents to have effects that grow and decay over time and by pursuing a rigorous fixed
effects specification that allows us to specifically isolate the within-industry and within-pair dimen-
sion of the data, we are able to obtain estimates that we would argue are surprisingly well identified
in the face of natural concerns about reverse causality. For future work, an attractive extension
would be to adopt a more structural approach in order to disentangle whether foreign patents con-
tribute to the transmission of technological comparative advantage in a manner consistent with
theories of trade and growth.
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7 Figures
Figure 1: Growth in Cross-border Patenting Flows,1972-2008
Note: the left graph shows total world cross-border patents as share of total world patents. The right graph shows
growth in cross-border patenting between 1972-2008 versus growth in world trade and world real GDP. All values in
the right graph are normalized to 1 in 1972. World trade values are deflated using the US GDP deflator. Patent
counts are the raw number of patents filed in a given year. Sources: PATSTAT, WDI.
Figure 2: Counts of patents by origin type and destination type, 1972-2008
Note: Patent counts are the raw number of patents filed in a given year. We include cross-border patents only. Source:
PATSTAT.
32
8 Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics of patent data
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Patent flow (unweighted) 7 0 89 0 30, 532
OECD 11 0 110 0 30, 532
Other 1 0 31 0 21, 438
Patent flow (weighted) 33 0 529 0 131, 408
OECD 59 0 718 0 131, 408
Other 2 0 48 0 27, 274
Patent stock 179 0 2914 0 593, 947
OECD 322 0 3729 0 593, 947
Other 10 0 185 0 34, 179
Patent stock (non-zero only) 689 10 5683 0.0001 593, 947
OECD 958 19 6771 0.0002 593, 497
Other 61 2 446 0.0001 34, 179
Unweighted patent flows are simple counts of the number of patents filed. Weighted patents flows account for value by weighting each patent
by its family size. Stocks are created using the value-weighted patent flows. Due to the concordance between the patent and trade datasets,
flows can be non-integer values below 1.
Table 2: Do Cross-Border Patent Promote Trade?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FTA 0.376*** 0.386*** 0.270*** 0.167*** 0.404*** 0.241*** 0.155*** 0.128*** 0.164***
(0.140) (0.142) (0.055) (0.037) (0.122) (0.049) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
log K̂ijkt (export effect) 0.307*** 0.296*** 0.404*** 0.059*** 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.018** 0.016** 0.017**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log K̂jikt (import effect) 0.031** 0.057*** 0.038** -0.001 0.069*** 0.032*** 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.004) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
FTAt+4 (lead FTA effect) 0.049*
(0.025)
log K̂ijt+4 (export effect, lead) 0.003
(0.011)
log K̂jit+4 (import effect, lead) -0.002
(0.003)
Fixed effects and other controls:
Country pair x x x x
Industry x x
Time x x x x
Exporter-time x x
Importer-time x x
Exporter-industry-time x x x x
Importer-industry-time x x x x
Industry-country pair x x x x x
Time-varying trade cost controls x
N 1,102,503 1,102,503 1,102,404 1,080,301 1,022,501 1,022,388 1,000,617 904,131 1,000,617
The dependent variable is industry-level (3 digit SITC rev 2) trade flows between 149 countries covering 1974-2006, using every 4 years. All estimations use
PPML. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by country-pair. log K̂jikt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the importer j in the
exporting country i in industry k. log K̂ijt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the exporting country i in the importing country j in industry k.
The construction of these stocks is described in Section 4.2. “Time-varying trade cost controls” refers to three-way interactions between standard pairwise gravity
controls (log distance, common language, and common legal system), a time fixed effect, and the degree of R&D intensity in that that industry (high vs. medium
vs. low R&D intensity). Observation counts vary because we first use the algorithm of Correia (2015) to reduce the sample by removing perfectly predicted
observations.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Concentration of Effects in More Competitive Industries & More Distant Export Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FTA 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.128*** 0.166*** 0.158*** 0.166*** 0.140*** 0.171***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
log K̂ijkt (export effect) 0.018** 0.001 0.001 0.013* 0.013* -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
log K̂jikt (import effect) 0.000 0.005 0.007** 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.007* 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
log K̂ijkt × high elasticity 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.037***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
log K̂jikt × high elasticity -0.011** -0.013** -0.011** -0.014*** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log K̂ijkt × ln DIST 0.011*** 0.010** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
log K̂jikt × ln DIST -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
FTAt+4 (lead FTA effect) 0.050** 0.047* 0.048*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
log K̂ijt+4 (export effect, lead) -0.002 0.002 -0.003
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
log K̂jit+4 (import effect, lead) -0.006 0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
log K̂ijkt+4 × high elasticity 0.012 0.011
(0.015) (0.015)
log K̂jikt+4 × high elasticity 0.008 0.008
(0.006) (0.006)
log K̂ijkt+4 × ln DIST 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
log K̂jikt+4 × ln DIST -0.008** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004)
log K̂ijkt × LANG -0.022**
(0.010)
log K̂jikt × LANG -0.019**
(0.009)
log K̂ijkt × LEGAL 0.018***
(0.007)
log K̂jikt × LEGAL 0.003
(0.006)
log K̂ijkt × MED IPR 0.014
(0.025)
log K̂jikt × MED IPR -0.010
(0.022)
log K̂ijkt × HIGH IPR 0.002
(0.023)
log K̂jikt × HIGH IPR 0.011
(0.023)
N 1,000,617 999,600 903,481 1,000,617 904,131 999,600 903,481 999,600
The dependent variable is industry-level (3 digit SITC rev 2) trade flows between 149 countries covering 1974-2006, using every 4 years.
Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by country-pair. All estimations use PPML with exporter-industry-time (ikt),
importer-industry-time (jkt), and exporter-importer-industry (ijk) fixed effects. log K̂jikt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by
the importer j in the exporting country i in industry k. log K̂ijkt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the exporting country i
in the importing country j in industry k. The construction of these stocks is described in Section 4.2. Observation counts vary because we
first use the algorithm of Correia (2015) to reduce the sample by removing perfectly predicted observations.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: High- & Medium-Tech vs. Low-Tech Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low-tech High- & med- tech Med-tech High-tech
FTA 0.262*** 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.143*** 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.192*** 0.135***
(0.062) (0.067) (0.065) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037)
log K̂ijkt (export effect) 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.019** -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.004
(0.011) (0.018) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
log K̂jikt (import effect) -0.005 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.006 0.005 -0.007 0.008
(0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
log K̂ijkt × high elasticity 0.003 0.008 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.037**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018)
log K̂jikt × high elasticity -0.003 -0.005 -0.012** -0.012** 0.009 -0.025**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
log K̂ijkt × ln DIST 0.003 0.003 0.011*** 0.009** 0.009 0.009*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
log K̂jikt × ln DIST -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
log K̂ijkt × LANG 0.027 -0.029*** -0.014 -0.040***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
log K̂jikt × LANG -0.048*** -0.016* -0.025** -0.008
(0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
log K̂ijkt × LEGAL 0.004 0.019*** 0.021** 0.018**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
log K̂jikt × LEGAL 0.013 0.002 0.007 0.002
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
log K̂ijkt × MED IPR -0.184*** 0.045* -0.023 0.106***
(0.063) (0.026) (0.030) (0.035)
log K̂jikt × MED IPR 0.024 -0.012 -0.017 -0.017
(0.036) (0.024) (0.027) (0.036)
log K̂ijkt × HIGH IPR -0.118** 0.021 -0.013 0.068**
(0.048) (0.024) (0.027) (0.034)
log K̂jikt × HIGH IPR -0.024 0.018 0.013 0.016
(0.038) (0.026) (0.028) (0.039)
N 168,495 168,495 168,495 832,122 831,105 831,105 494,036 306,260
The dependent variable is industry-level (3 digit SITC rev 2) trade flows between 149 countries covering 1974-2006, using every 4 years. Standard errors,
shown in parentheses, are clustered by country-pair. All estimations use PPML with exporter-industry-time (ikt), importer-industry-time (jkt), and
exporter-importer-industry (ijk) fixed effects. log K̂jikt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the importer j in the exporting country i in
industry k. log K̂ijkt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the exporting country i in the importing country j in industry k. The construction
of these stocks is described in Section 4.2. High- and medium-tech industries are distinguished from low-tech industries using R&D intensities (R&D/Sales
ratios) from Nunn and Trefler (2013). Observation counts vary because we first use the algorithm of Correia (2015) to reduce the sample by removing
perfectly predicted observations.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Industry-level Breakdown (by end-use)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Differentiated Homogeneous Intermediate
Goods
Final Goods Consumption
Goods
Capital
Goods
Pharma No Pharma
FTA 0.163*** 0.236*** 0.211*** 0.061 0.108** 0.070 0.203** 0.170***
(0.030) (0.072) (0.029) (0.046) (0.052) (0.048) (0.096) (0.029)
log K̂ijkt (export effect) -0.001 -0.020 -0.005 0.004 -0.010 0.023 0.028 -0.003
(0.009) (0.054) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.038) (0.009)
log K̂jikt (import effect) 0.004 0.045** 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.011 -0.009 0.006
(0.005) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.005)
log K̂ijkt × high elasticity 0.042*** 0.029 0.041*** 0.032* 0.051** 0.012 0.039***
(0.011) (0.059) (0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.011)
log K̂jikt × high elasticity -0.010* -0.051** -0.005 -0.025*** 0.002 -0.045*** -0.013**
(0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005)
log K̂ijkt × ln DIST 0.010** -0.000 0.010** 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.052*** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.019) (0.004)
log K̂jikt × ln DIST -0.005 -0.005 -0.007** 0.001 0.005 -0.004 0.019 -0.006*
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.003)
log K̂ijkt × LANG -0.027** 0.042 -0.021* -0.023 -0.005 -0.034* 0.071 -0.025**
(0.011) (0.028) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.064) (0.011)
log K̂jikt × LANG -0.023** -0.009 -0.016 -0.025* -0.045*** -0.013 -0.025 -0.020**
(0.009) (0.020) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.038) (0.009)
log K̂ijkt × LEGAL 0.020*** -0.001 0.017** 0.020** -0.002 0.019 -0.050 0.020***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.031) (0.007)
log K̂jikt × LEGAL 0.001 0.029** -0.002 0.012 0.010 0.002 -0.052** 0.006
(0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.006)
log K̂ijkt × MED IPR 0.039 -0.177** 0.019 -0.000 0.014 0.065 0.222 0.011
(0.025) (0.079) (0.030) (0.032) (0.040) (0.044) (0.141) (0.025)
log K̂jikt × MED IPR -0.017 0.053 -0.013 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.281*** -0.012
(0.023) (0.058) (0.026) (0.033) (0.040) (0.048) (0.104) (0.022)
log K̂ijkt × HIGH IPR 0.016 -0.084 -0.007 0.016 0.083** -0.003 0.135* 0.000
(0.024) (0.061) (0.026) (0.028) (0.037) (0.036) (0.081) (0.023)
log K̂jikt × HIGH IPR 0.011 -0.001 0.014 0.004 0.005 0.024 0.320*** 0.009
(0.024) (0.058) (0.027) (0.034) (0.036) (0.049) (0.104) (0.023)
N 887,334 112,266 674,484 325,116 206,841 173,942 10,640 884,454
The dependent variable is industry-level (3 digit SITC rev 2) trade flows between 149 countries covering 1974-2006, using every 4 years. Standard errors, shown in parentheses,
are clustered by country-pair. All estimations use PPML with exporter-industry-time (ikt), importer-industry-time (jkt), and exporter-importer-industry (ijk) fixed effects.
log K̂jikt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the importer j in the exporting country i in industry k. log K̂ijkt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by
the exporting country i in the importing country j in industry k. The construction of these stocks is described in Section 4.2. Homogeneous versus differentiated industries are
distinguished using the classification from Rauch (1999). “Intermediate Goods", “Final Goods”, “Capital Goods”, and “Consumption Goods” are determined using BEC
classifications for these categories at the HS 6 digit level. More precisely, any 3 digit SITC industry in which more than one-half of world trade meets the BEC definition for
one of these categories is coded as belonging to that category. Observation counts vary because we first use the algorithm of Correia (2015) to reduce the sample by removing
perfectly predicted observations.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Industry-level Heterogeneity (by factor-intensity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
High-value
added
Skill-
intensive
Capital-
intensive
Building-
intensive
Machine-
intensive
Automobile-
intensive
Computer-
intensive
“Other
capital”-
intensive
Labor-
intensive
FTA 0.178*** 0.147*** 0.177*** 0.123*** 0.188*** 0.160*** 0.192*** 0.172*** 0.238***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.042)
log K̂ijkt (export effect) -0.006 -0.007 0.001 -0.017 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
log K̂jikt (import effect) 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
log K̂ijkt × high elasticity 0.042*** 0.041** 0.038** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.054***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
log K̂jikt × high elasticity -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.006 -0.023*** -0.006 -0.014* -0.012* -0.009 -0.018*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
log K̂ijkt × ln DIST 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.009** 0.013*** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
log K̂jikt × ln DIST -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
log K̂ijkt × LANG -0.029** -0.018 -0.027** -0.014 -0.020* -0.029** -0.028** -0.026** 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
log K̂jikt × LANG -0.012 -0.015 -0.017 -0.010 -0.021* -0.014 -0.020* -0.018* -0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
log K̂ijkt × LEGAL 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.015* 0.028*** 0.016** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.017*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
log K̂jikt × LEGAL -0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
log K̂ijkt × MED IPR 0.007 0.041 0.039 0.062* 0.032 0.063** 0.038 0.046 -0.001
(0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029)
log K̂jikt × MED IPR -0.008 0.008 -0.051* -0.029 -0.030 -0.026 -0.012 -0.043 0.041
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034)
log K̂ijkt × HIGH IPR 0.001 0.014 0.016 0.039 0.014 0.038 0.021 0.018 0.028
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
log K̂jikt × HIGH IPR 0.001 0.014 -0.015 -0.025 0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.025 0.045
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033)
N 513,994 516,679 511,049 516,126 520,931 571779 566,655 562,974 225,282
The dependent variable is industry-level (3 digit SITC rev 2) trade flows between 149 countries covering 1974-2006, using every 4 years. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered
by country-pair. All estimations use PPML with exporter-industry-time (ikt), importer-industry-time (jkt), and exporter-importer-industry (ijk) fixed effects. log K̂jikt refers to (the log of)
the stock of patents filed by the importer j in the exporting country i in industry k. log K̂ijkt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the exporting country i in the importing
country j in industry k. The construction of these stocks is described in Section 4.2. Homogeneous versus differentiated industries are distinguished using the classification from Rauch
(1999). Parts & accessories shares are obtained using the BEC classification. Industry-level value added shares, skill intensities, and all capital intensities (including Building-, Machine-,
Automobile-, Computer-, and “Other capital”-intensities) are constructed using data from Nunn and Trefler (2013). For each of these factor intensity measures, we take any industry with an
intensity higher than the median intensity across all industries to be intensive in that factor. Labor-intensive industries are industries which are neither capital-intensive nor skill-intensive.
Observation counts vary because we first use the algorithm of Correia (2015) to reduce the sample by removing perfectly predicted observations.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Additional Sensitivity Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Drop EPO
Countries
Drop USA Drop
Low-IPR
Importers
Add ijt FE Relax ikt,
jkt FEs
Time-
varying
trade cost
controls
Slower
Patent
Decay
Faster
Patent
Decay
Use
log (1+K̂)
FTA 0.155*** 0.175*** 0.182*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.149***
(0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.022)
log K̂ijkt (export effect) -0.047 0.025 -0.145*** 0.009 0.082* -0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.002
(0.064) (0.038) (0.036) (0.008) (0.044) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
log K̂jikt (import effect) 0.065 0.030 0.036 0.035 0.074** 0.007 0.012 0.011 0.008
(0.073) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.035) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
log K̂ijkt × high elasticity 0.094*** 0.023** 0.041*** 0.022** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.024** 0.019*** 0.028***
(0.025) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
log K̂jikt × high elasticity -0.042*** -0.005 -0.010* -0.012** -0.011 -0.012** -0.008 -0.005 -0.002
(0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log K̂ijkt × ln DIST 0.004 -0.003 0.017*** 0.014*** -0.008 0.008* 0.006 0.008** -0.000
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log K̂jikt × ln DIST -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007* -0.006* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
log K̂ijkt × LANG -0.037* -0.020 -0.019* -0.024 -0.052*** -0.037*** 0.023*** 0.020*** -0.023*
(0.021) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013)
log K̂jikt × LANG 0.002 -0.020* -0.019** -0.022** 0.005 -0.032*** 0.013* 0.013* -0.024**
(0.020) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
log K̂ijkt × LEGAL 0.042*** 0.006 0.015* -0.008 0.007 0.019** -0.029*** -0.022** 0.010
(0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
log K̂jikt × LEGAL 0.025 -0.002 0.007 -0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.022* -0.021** 0.005
(0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
log K̂ijkt × MED IPR 0.123*** 0.016 -0.036* -0.011 0.007 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014*
(0.048) (0.025) (0.021) (0.033) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
log K̂jikt × MED IPR 0.049 0.009 -0.001 0.065** -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 0.000
(0.047) (0.021) (0.017) (0.025) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
log K̂ijkt × HIGH IPR 0.052 0.007 0.005 -0.018 0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.018*
(0.053) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.023) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
log K̂jikt × HIGH IPR 0.058 0.021 0.016 0.005 0.035 0.007 -0.016** -0.015** -0.008
(0.046) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
N 158,665 895,845 914,833 996,734 1,016,742 999,600 999,600 999,600 3,544,739
The dependent variable is industry-level (3 digit SITC rev 2) trade flows between 149 countries covering 1974-2006, using every 4 years. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by
country-pair. Columns 1-3 and 6-9 use PPML with exporter-industry-time (ikt), importer-industry-time (jkt), and exporter-importer-industry (ijk) fixed effects. Column 4 adds an ijt fixed effect and
column 5 uses it, jt, and kt fixed effects in place of the ikt and jkt fixed effects. “Time-varying trade cost controls” (used in column 6) refers to three-way interactions between standard pairwise
gravity controls (log distance, common language, and common legal system), a time fixed effect, and the degree of R&D intensity in that that industry (high vs. medium vs. low R&D intensity).
log K̂jikt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the importer j in the exporting country i in industry k. log K̂ikjt refers to (the log of) the stock of patents filed by the exporting country i in
the importing country j in industry k. The construction of these stocks is described in Section 4.2. Observation counts vary because we first use the algorithm of Correia (2015) to reduce the sample
by removing perfectly predicted observations.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
38
